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Methodological pluralism and pluralism of method 
Sheila C. Dow 
1. INTRODUCTION
Pluralism is the philosophical position that the ultimate reality of the universe consists of a plurality of 
entities; it is an ontological position. But the concept of pluralism can be applied at a variety of levels: to 
the (epistemological) understanding of reality (whether its ultimate nature is a plurality or not), to the 
methods employed to theorize about that understanding of reality, to the methodology which sets the criteria 
for theory choice, and to the study of methodologies themselves. Pluralism has been advocated at all of 
these levels in economics discourse. But an understanding of what is entailed by methodological pluralism 
and pluralism of method has been hampered by lack of reference to epistemological and ontological 
foundations. In particular, pluralism takes on a different meaning in a closed-system mode of thought (as in 
mainstream economics) from its meaning in an open-system mode of thought (as in post-Keynesian 
economics or institutional/evolutionary economics). The former can be thought of as ‘pure pluralism’, as the 
dual of a monist position, while the latter involves a more limited, although crucial, pluralism. 
 It is the purpose of this chapter to attempt to distinguish pluralism at the different levels, and according to 
different ontological and epistemological positions, and to assess whether the validity of the pluralist 
position differs as between these different levels. It is concluded that a pure pluralist position is untenable at 
any level, but that a modiﬁed methodological pluralism is to be welcomed if grounded in an appropriate 
ontological and epistemic position, i.e. that reality and knowledge of it are understood as open systems. 
2. OPEN AND CLOSED SYSTEMS
Much of the following argument rests on the distinction between open and closed systems. Therefore, 
before considering pluralism as such, we consider ﬁrst the nature of that distinction. An open system is one 
whose boundaries are not predetermined. Further, the nature and range of its constituent variables and the 
structure of their interrelationships are not predetermined. This is not a matter of stochastic variation. In 
contrast, the boundaries of a closed system are predetermined, as are the full range of constituent variables 
and the structure of their interrelationships. This does not preclude the possibility of stochastic variation. 
While closed systems are the province of classical logic, open systems are the province of a broader system 
of logic – ordinary logic, or human logic, as exempliﬁed by Keynes (1973). While including classical logic 
as a special case for application under conditions of certainty, ordinary logic can also be applied to 
conditions of uncertainty, as pertain in open systems. 
 At the ontological level, the system is a system of real processes and phenomena. An understanding of 
reality as conforming to an open system may involve notions of human creativity and freedom of choice, for 
example. A closed-system understanding of reality may involve the notion of a grand plan on the part of the 
deity, and the absence of free will. Knowledge systems applied to this reality may be open or closed in 
either case. On the face of it, it might seem that an open-system ontology would entail an open-system 
epistemology, and similarly for a closed-system ontology. But, even if reality is an open system, it can be 
argued that knowledge can only be acquired by proceeding as if reality were a closed system. Alternatively, 
even if reality is a closed system, it can be argued that human knowledge inevitably cannot encompass the 
full system, so that it must itself conform to an open system. 
 General equilibrium theorizing is a ﬁne example of a closed-system theoretical structure. Variables are 
clearly deﬁned with ﬁxed meaning, and the boundaries of the system are well deﬁned according to which 
variables are endogenous and which exogenous. The aim is to reach agreement on the best representation of 
the structural relationships between variables, for universal application. This entails conformity of 
representation through formalism. The appraisal criterion of conformity to the principles of classical logic 
reﬂects a closed-system epistemology; where the additional criterion is applied of goodness of ﬁt in 
econometric testing, a closed-system ontology is evident. 
 If reality is an open system, then any closed theoretical system can only have partial application. Formal 
systems are necessarily closed, since it is necessary to give variables ﬁxed meaning, and to specify 
structural relationships and the exogenous variables. Other methods, however, can themselves be open; 
verbal analysis in particular allows for shades of meaning. 
 Once we move away from a closed-system ontology and/or a closed-system epistemology, the question of 
pluralism – its meaning and role – becomes interesting. If reality is an open system, how do we specify open 
systems of knowledge, and what role can closed subsystems of knowledge play? If knowledge is open (even 
if reality is closed), how do we choose the forms of (inevitably partial) knowledge to aim for? In what 
follows, we attempt to unravel the different possible senses of pluralism, and how they relate to different 
ontological and epistemological positions. 
 
 
3. ONTOLOGICAL PLURALISM 
 
Pluralism at the ontological level involves the belief that reality constitutes a plurality of entities. If this 
position is to be non-trivial, it involves a rejection of the notion of the unity of nature. In its pure form, 
ontological pluralism denies the existence of unifying forces in nature; if nature is pluralistic, then there is 
no scope for general theorizing. In economics, this position is most closely associated with postmodernism; 
postmodernism emphasizes fragmentation, even of the self (see Amariglio, 1988). Ontological pluralism 
entails epistemic pluralism (understanding is fragmented). Together these pluralisms deny any scope for 
theory (see Amariglio, 1990); indeed some postmodernists embrace the term ‘nihilism’ (see Amariglio and 
Ruccio, 1995), the term with which Gordon (1991) chooses to characterize pluralism. Similarly, they deny 
any role for methodology. 
 Yet the content of postmodernism belies these implications; general statements are made about reality, 
theories are put forward, and methodological statements made. In other words, pure ontological pluralism 
and its implications are untenable; any theoretical statement requires the belief in some regularity in 
understanding and/or in nature. The only possibilities then, if discourse is to occur at all, are a modiﬁed 
pluralism (partial regularities), or the belief in universal regularities. Many non-mainstream economists, 
other than postmodernists, hold a modiﬁed pluralist position, based on an organicist ontology (see for 
example Carabelli’s (1995) account of Keynes’s organicism). This position holds that there are regularities 
in nature which science should aim to identify, but that these regularities are of process rather than events 
(see Lawson, 1989, 1995); they cannot be isolated from evolutionary or other irregularities. The economy, 
like knowledge, is therefore best understood as an open system. 
 Mainstream economics on the other hand has traditionally seen its scope as being deﬁned by universal 
regularities which can be separated dualistically from irregularities and are best understood within a closed 
theoretical system (see Dow, 1990a). Most mainstream economists, notably deductivists, are not explicit 
about their ontological position. But Lawson (1994) demonstrates that the view of science on which 
deductivism is based entails what he refers to as a ‘Humean’ ontology in terms of event regularities. 
 How far regularities can be perceived, if they exist, is an epistemic issue. We shall see in the next section 
that epistemic pluralism is not the sole preserve of ontological pluralists. 
 
 
4. EPISTEMIC PLURALISM 
 
Epistemic pluralism entails a plurality of understandings of reality; there is no known way of establishing 
what constitutes true knowledge. Logical positivism requires that theory be appraised with reference to an 
independent set of facts, implying that there is only one way in which (correctly) to know facts. Logical 
positivism came under serious threat in the 1960s, a period in which the notion that authority had sole 
access to the truth was fundamentally questioned. In the philosophy of science, Popper’s (1959) fallibilism 
had laid the groundwork, but it was Kuhn (1962) who captured the imagination with his argument that 
understanding is paradigm-speciﬁc; what appears to be contrary evidence may not be perceived as such if it 
threatens the power of the dominant paradigm. 
 Out of this change developed a distinctive perspective on understanding; this perspective is evident both 
in the rhetoric/hermeneutic approach as well as in postmodernism. Both take a pluralist position on 
understanding. The postmodernist epistemic pluralism follows directly from the postmodern pluralist 
ontology; even the individual has the potential for a plurality of understanding. The rhetoric/hermeneutic 
approach is inspired by Rorty’s (1979) view that philosophy cannot mirror nature; no position is taken on 
whether ultimate reality is a plurality or not. (See the exchange between Mäki’s (1988) attempt to tease out 
a rhetoric ontology, and McCloskey’s (1988) reply.) Rather, understanding of reality is expressed by means 
of a plurality of narratives. Thus not only is reality discussed by means of a plurality of narratives, but that 
reality itself is to be read as a plurality of narratives (see Lavoie, 1990, Introduction, and Brown, 1994). 
There is no basis for choosing one narrative over another. 
 The logical positivist belief in a unitary objective understanding of facts nevertheless persists in much of 
economics (see Boland, 1991 and Lawson, 1994). The difﬁculty of devising deﬁnitive empirical tests has 
thrown increasing doubt on the truth-value of theory (see Boland, 1989, p. 88), but in general the truth-
value of the facts themselves is not questioned among mainstream economists. For the increasingly 
dominant deductivists, the truth-value of facts is seen as having relevance only regarding axioms, and these 
are asserted to be self-evident. A signiﬁcant exception is the explicitly pluralist epistemic position taken by 
Weintraub (1989); his position has shifted from being Lakatosian (which as a basis for theory appraisal 
requires a unitary set of facts) to denying the scope for theory appraisal on the grounds that facts are theory-
laden, i.e. there is a plurality of understanding of reality. 
 Epistemologically, there should be a direct parallel between a pluralist understanding (possibly of a 
pluralist reality) among economic agents and economists alike. This is the case for postmodernists and the 
rhetoric approach; there is no basis for choosing between understandings among agents or among 
economists. In contrast, the logical positivist position entails a unitary understanding of facts by agents and 
a corresponding unitary understanding by economists (though both may be expressed probabilistically). 
Curiously no such parallel is evident in Weintraub’s work; if facts are theory-laden for economists, surely 
they must also be theory-laden for agents. An acceptance of this point would have profound implications for 
general equilibrium theorizing. It is the plurality of understanding by economic agents, in the postmodern 
view, which undermines theorizing in general. 
 Non-mainstream economists other than employers of postmodernism and the rhetoric approach (post-
Keynesians, or institutionalist/evolutionary economists, for example) employ an open-system epistemology 
which allows for a range of understandings but also for theorizing. Following directly from an organicist 
ontology, or from the view that human understanding of reality (whether ultimately organicist or not) is 
necessarily limited, it is argued that we can only understand reality as an open, organic system. Keynes’s 
(1973) philosophy provides an epistemology for open organic systems; since knowledge in general is based 
on imperfect knowledge, it is inevitable that there will be a range of understandings of reality, among agents 
as well as economists. But this epistemology differs from pure pluralism in that there are regularities in the 
knowledge-generation process of agents and economists which limit the range of rational beliefs; the choice 
of belief (among agents and economists) is a matter for rational debate. 
 We now see how these different epistemologies feed through into positions on method, and then on 
methodology. 
 
 
5. PLURALISM OF METHOD 
 
Pluralism of method is the methodological position that there are no decisive criteria for selecting one best 
method of analysis (for example the deductivist method, or the experimental method); economists should 
therefore employ a plurality of methods. The major inﬂuence is Popper (1959) who saw a role for 
situational logic in the social sciences, given the difﬁculties with falsiﬁcationism; the choice of method 
should then be problem-dependent (see Caldwell, 1991, who also appears supportive of pluralism of 
method). This version of pluralism (also known as eclecticism) has been advocated by Hutchison (1988), 
Boland (1982) and Solow (1988) without any hint of pluralism at the epistemic or ontological levels; all 
three subscribe to a unitary epistemology and ontology. But if there is unitary understanding of such 
regularities as can be perceived (i.e. the epistemology and ontology conform to those of logical positivism) 
then pluralism of method can only be explained in terms of the failure of traditional methodology to 
produce satisfactory criteria for choosing methods. Practising economists must choose methods by some 
criteria; on what grounds are these criteria to be selected? In principle, it should be possible to construct a 
taxonomy of problem-types and advocate methods accordingly, given the starting point that economics aims 
to identify regularities that are presumed to exist. Boland (1989) takes case studies to illustrate the process 
of method choice. Mayer (1993) advocates a particular set of criteria based on the distinction between pure 
and applied theory. He advocates internal, formalist criteria for deductive theory and client satisfaction for 
empirical theory. But without any epistemological explanation for the need for a range of methods, given a 
unitary ontology and epistemology, a body of thought made up of pure theory and applied theory, with no 
explicit connection between the two, appears simply incoherent. 
 It might seem that pluralism of method could be justiﬁed by a pluralist epistemology. Since reality may 
be understood in a variety of ways, and there are no grounds for preferring one understanding over another, 
there are no grounds for choosing one method of acquiring knowledge over another. The 
rhetoric/hermeneutic approach takes an agnostic position (different methods are taken on their own merits 
but there is no advocacy of pluralism, indeed there is a denial of methodology in general). The 
postmodernist approach might be interpreted as advocating a plurality of methods; one of its most notable 
features is the denial of general theories. But, as has been suggested above, any postmodern position on 
method is self-contradictory; the essence of postmodernism is to eschew normative statements, and indeed 
theory in general. 
 The advocacy of a range of methods is entailed by the open-system epistemology of approaches such as 
that adopted by post-Keynesian economists, or institutional/evolutionary economists. But this is not 
pluralism of method in the eclecticism sense, although it is commonly misunderstood by others as such. It is 
entailed by an open-system epistemology that knowledge is acquired by gathering evidence and 
constructing arguments in order to build up rational belief. These contributions to knowledge are 
incommensurate in the sense that they do not build up to a single probability statistic, i.e. they do not ﬁt into 
closed-system theorizing. Certainly the choice of a range of methods depends on the nature of the problem 
and the context. But the choice is guided (and thus limited) by reason, by convention and by vision; it is 
differences in these that account for different schools of thought which have in common open-system 
theorizing (see Dow, 1990b). To distinguish this approach from that of the eclecticists, it must be 
emphasized that reason, conventions and vision all take on a particular meaning and play an explicit part in 
open-system epistemology (terms do not have unitary meaning). Closed-system reason is only a subset of 
open-system reason (see Carabelli, 1988). Conventions are a necessity in building up knowledge in 
Keynesian logic (see Hodgson, 1988), while in mainstream epistemology they lack logical foundation, as 
Boland (1982) has tirelessly pointed out. Finally, vision (or ontology) determines how problems are 
identiﬁed and interpreted (see Dow, 1990b). Given an open-system ontology, there is a range of 
possibilities; given a closed-system, unitary ontology, there is only one. 
 
 
6. METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM 
 
Methodological pluralism is a meta-methodological position; it advocates that methodologists study a range 
of methodologies (by means of rational reconstruction). Critical pluralism involves the criticism of this 
range of methodologies by means of a range of criteria. This position has been advocated most notably by 
Caldwell (1982, 1986, 1988). The underlying reasoning is that there is no basis for deciding on one 
methodology. Rather than devoting fruitless efforts to ﬁnding the best methodology, methodologists should 
devote their efforts to promoting methodological understanding among economists by clarifying the nature 
of the different possibilities and demonstrating their strengths and weaknesses according to different 
criteria. (Boland (1982, 1991) at times also seems to be a methodological pluralist as well as a pluralist of 
method. Redman (1991) advocates a critical rationalist version of methodological pluralism.) 
 Although this positive role for methodology counters the anti-methodology position of the 
rhetoric/hermeneutic approach, Caldwell (1990) embraces the hermeneutic idea of taking each approach on 
its own merits to promote a better understanding among practitioners of different approaches. The critical 
element is additional, however, and represents the fundamental meta-methodological difference from the 
hermeneutic approach. The rhetoric/hermeneutic approach accepts plurality of understanding and plurality 
of method as a description of reality, but refuses to make any normative judgement about the nature or 
extent of those pluralities; postmodernists positively welcome plurality of understanding and method (the 
more the better, as a reﬂection of a fundamentally fragmented reality). Caldwell, rather (from his Popperian 
starting point) appears to regard a wide plurality of methodologies as a regrettable necessity, and looks 
forward to the outcome of methodological pluralism as being a narrowing-down of possibilities (see 
Caldwell, 1989). 
 But, as was pointed out in the discussion of Caldwell’s (1988) paper (see de Marchi, 1988, pp. 53-6), 
Caldwell does not spell out the epistemological foundations of his methodological pluralism (nor its 
ontological foundations). What is the reason for a range of methodologies in the ﬁrst place? Is it in the 
nature of knowledge (and reality) that it be so, as the open-system approach suggests? Or is it a temporary 
limitation on our understanding, as the eclecticist approach suggests? Or is it pure folly that methodologies 
and methodologists persist at all in spite of the fragmentation of knowledge (and possibly reality) as the 
rhetoric approach and postmodernists suggest? 
 Critical methodological pluralism explicitly aims to go beyond description. But as with eclecticist 
pluralists, the question arises as to the criteria for criticism. Caldwell advocates particularly criticism in a 
methodology’s own terms as a way of promoting greater understanding of a particular methodology. Such 
an effort is clearly preferable to the all-too-common criticism of one methodology by the criteria of another 
(see Caldwell, 1986). But it is only feasible up to a point. If the justiﬁcation of methodological pluralism is 
epistemic, then, just as facts are theory-laden and theories are methodology-laden, so must the knowledge of 
methodologists be coloured by their own vision of reality and of how knowledge is constructed; epistemic 
pluralism, after all, is a recognition that there are different understandings of reality, but in general any one 
economist or methodologist only has one understanding. I can attest from personal experience of trying to 
present a range of schools of thought in their own terms (Dow, 1985) that it is not possible to switch fully 
satisfactorily in a detached fashion from one ontology-plus-epistemology to another. But without a pluralist 
epistemology, what is the justiﬁcation for methodological pluralism? 
 While I share Caldwell’s view that trying to understand different methodologies in their own terms is a 
worthwhile exercise and should serve to promote more constructive debate among economists, the scope for 
that understanding is always conditional on the methodologist’s own ontological and epistemological 
position. This applies even more strongly to the application of external criteria, which must be chosen 
according to some further criteria if the exercise is to have meaning. 
 Caldwell’s statements of methodological pluralism have tremendous appeal in their advocacy of 
civilized, reasoned, non-self-serving behaviour. But methodological pluralism, as presented so far, lacks 
force because of its lack of epistemic and ontological foundations. In traditional epistemic (i.e. dualist) 
terms, methodological pluralism can be interpreted as non-methodology because it does not establish 
standards. Understood as the dual of traditional methodology, methodological pluralism may be understood 
as according with the rhetoric approach, which denies methodology any role. But understood as a means of 
improving knowledge, where knowledge is understood as an open system, methodological pluralism is fully 
justiﬁed. Methodologists cannot escape their own preconceptions any more than anyone else. But an 
ontological and epistemic awareness can enhance awareness of these preconceptions, which in turn can 
enhance awareness among economists at large of their preconceptions. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
I conclude therefore that methodological pluralism in a pure form, like pluralism of method, pluralist 
epistemology and pluralist ontology, is untenable as a basis for knowledge. Pure pluralism is taken here to 
be the dual of the traditional unitary position of mainstream economics. Further, the justiﬁcation of 
methodological pluralism or pluralism of method is not at all clear when either is combined with a unitary, 
closed-system epistemology and/or ontology. On the other hand, the recognition of the inevitability of a 
range of methodologies and the advocacy of the employment of a particular range of methods is the logical 
outcome of an open-system epistemology and ontology. 
 This chapter is offered as an exercise in open-system meta-methodology. It offers an attempt at a rational 
reconstruction of a range of positions with respect to pluralism, in the full knowledge that these 
reconstructions may be ﬂawed, not least because of my own preconceptions. But this is how knowledge 
progresses: offering arguments provides scope for feedback to correct misunderstandings and to direct 
modiﬁcations in thinking. Within an open-system approach there is no contradiction involved in arguing for 
one’s own viewpoint while respecting and being open to the viewpoints of others. 
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